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Abstract 
 
 
This paper aims to assess the consistency and coherency of al-Qaeda’s 
theological and political ideologies following its shift to terrorism in the early 
1990s and through the transition from terrorist group to global movement. The 
paper will identify a political/theological ideology that is based in and justified 
through Islam, specifically supported by the concepts of jihad (struggle) and 
shahid (martyr). This analysis finds that through the shift of al-Qaeda from a 
terrorist group to a movement (which is ideologically directed by al-Qaeda), 
the group’s doctrine and ideology lack consistency. This lack of consistency 
specifically concerns the ideological position on democracy and reform within 
an Islamic state, and secondly the views on Shiite Muslims, particularly within 
Iraq.  
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During the invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001 by the coalition led by the 
United States, al-Qaeda’s second in command, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote the book 
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. This book outlined three goals for the newly 
mobilised ‘revolutionary fundamentalist movement’. These goals were: 1) to organise 
ideological clarity and coherence, 2) resist the current secular regimes within the 
Muslim world, and 3) establish an Islamic state. This paper aims to assess the 
progress this movement has made towards meeting this first goal through an 
examination of al-Qaeda’s statements, actions, and literature between the early 
1990s and 2006. Within the field of terrorism studies there has been a significant 
portion of literature that examines al-Qaeda’s ideology, goals, and statements from a 
number of disciplines. Such research includes Magnus Ranstorp’s (1998) 
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examination of bin Laden’s 1996 and 1998 fatwas,i  Christopher Henzel’s (2004) 
assessment of the origins of al-Qaeda’s ideology, Jeffery Haynes’ (2005) 
examination of al-Qaeda doctrine, and Christopher Blanchard’s (2005) treatment of 
the group’s evolving ideology. While these and other research provide a rich insight 
into al-Qaeda’s ideology and goals, the area has yet to examine the consistency of 
the ideology and goals of the movement, particularly in light of the importance al-
Zawahiri has placed on the role of this consistency for the future of the movement. 
Such an examination will also provide insight and analysis into the potential 
ramifications of such inconsistencies for the movement and provide a prospective 
basis for further research into the movement’s doctrine. 
 
Al-Qaedaii 
 
The response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked the foundation of what 
would become al-Qaeda. Individuals from all over the world, from Arabs to Asians, 
flocked to become Mujahideen (strugglers) and participate in the jihad (struggle in 
defence of Islam) in resistance to what was seen as a direct assault on Islam (Burke, 
2004). In 1984, Islamic scholar Abdullah Azzam and his student Osama bin Laden 
established the Makhtab al-Khadamat lil Mujahideen al-Arab (Afghan Services 
Bureau, MAK). MAK served as an office for the jihad against the Soviets; housing, 
training, and financing Muslims to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.  The MAK offices 
were established throughout 35 countries (including 30 offices in the US) and 
distributed propaganda, acting as recruiting centres for the jihad (Gunaratna, 2002).  
Azzam (1979) issued a clear fatwa for jihad in Afghanistan entitled Defence of the 
Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman that declared that the killing of kuffar 
(unbelievers) was an obligation of all Muslims. Around 25 000 Muslims from all over 
the world rallied to Afghanistan to join the local resistance against the Soviets 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004). 
 
Following the Mujahideen victory over the Red Army in 1989, Azzam wrote in his 
book Defending the Land of the Muslims is Each Man’s Most Important Duty: 
 
The duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan, jihad will remain an individual obligation 
until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again: 
before us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, 
Burma, southern Yemen, Tashkent, and Andalusia (Quoted in Burke, 2004: 73). 
 
This statement signalled the concept of the ‘global jihad’. These goals were to 
culminate with the reestablishment of the rule of the Islamic Caliphs. This position 
was initially based in the Wahhabist form of Sunni Islam through the works of Sayyid 
Qutb and Sayyid Abdul Al’a Mawdudi, eventually developing to the contemporary 
Salafist form of Sunni Islam through the writings of Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
The Salafist brand of Islam essentially forms the foundation of what would become 
al-Qaeda’s ideology.  
 
In 1989 Azzam was assassinated by a car bomb.iii Prior to the assassination, bin 
Laden was in the midst of creating a mobile fighting force for the defence of Islam 
based in Afghanistan. Following Azzam’s death, bin Laden merged MAK into his 
newly created Mujahideen unit, effectively forming al-Qaeda (Bergen, 2006). 
 
                                                 
i A fatwa is essentially a religious edict. 
ii This introduction to the formation of al-Qaeda is extremely brief due to length restrictions and as such 
is a very shallow and uncomprehensive background that merely aims to establish the central events in 
the group’s formation. 
iii No responsibility was claimed for the assassination, however Gunaratna (2002) maintains that bin 
Laden condoned the attack.  
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Operations between 1993-1996 
 
In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda focused on training and funding jihads in Chechnya, 
Kashmir, Indonesia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt (Gunaratna, 
2002). In 1993 Al-Qaeda had involvement in the first World Trade Centre bombing, 
which killed six and injured over one thousand. The group also planned the elaborate 
but failed 1994 Oplan Bojinka (Operation Explosion), which involved the 
assassination of Pope John Paul II, and US President Clinton, as well as the 
destruction of 11 US airliners and the CIA in Langley (United States Department of 
State, 2003). 
 
On November 13, 1995, individuals associated with bin Laden detonated a car bomb 
outside the offices of the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing seven (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). On June 25, 1996, 
a bomb consisting of approximately 4 000 pounds of explosives attached to a fuel 
truck driven by an Islamic extremist exploded outside the Khobar Towers military 
complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, housing US Air Force personnel. 19 US 
servicemen were killed and 372 were injured (Bergen, 2004). Al-Qaeda most likely 
assisted the Saudi Hezbollah guerrillas in these attacks (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The Khobar Towers operation saw 
the adoption of suicide bombing within this strand of international terrorism. In the 
second chapter of the al-Qaeda manual (nd.), ‘Necessary Qualifications and 
Characteristics for the Organisation’s Member’, qualification four reads: “Sacrifice: 
He [the member] has to be willing to do the work and undergo martyrdom for the 
purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion of majestic Allah on 
earth”. The concept of martyrdom through suicide bombings is a consistent and 
important element of al-Qaeda’s strategy and ideology.iv  
 
Declaration of War  
 
Two months following the devastating attack in Dharan, in August 1996, bin Laden 
released a fatwa entitled Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the 
Land of the Two Holy Places. This was a detailed and lengthy document that 
specifically and comprehensively detailed bin Laden’s early ideological doctrine. It is 
important to note that bin Laden did not command the religious authority to issue a 
fatwa and its implications for Muslims were not binding.  
 
This fatwa clearly established three elements of bin Laden’s ideological doctrine. The 
first was the most extensive and was a rational for and the declaration of war against 
the US, Israel, and their allies. The second was a critique of the Saudi regime. The 
final element of the fatwa discussed the mobilisation of the Islamic world, although 
this was the lesser of the three messages that run throughout the document. 
 
Bin Laden’s fatwa firstly concerned itself with the case for violent resistance against 
an imperial US. The fatwa stated that the Islamic nation has suffered from injustice, 
iniquity, and aggression from the Zionist/Crusaders and their allies, specifically he 
stated that:  
 
Their [Muslim] blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the 
massacre in Qana, in Lebanon, are still fresh in our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, 
Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippine, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eritria, Chechnya, and in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Quoted in Al Islah, 1996). 
 
                                                 
iv This concept was heavily influenced by Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
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The greatest aggression (since the death of the Prophet), bin Laden maintained, was 
the deployment of US military assets in Saudi Arabia which were to support 
Operation Desert Shield from August 1990. Bin Laden described this deployment as 
“the occupation of the land of the two holy places…by the armies of the American 
Crusaders and their allies (Quoted in Al Islah, 1996)”. 
 
Bin laden continued with the justification for the attacks on the US by making 
reference to the conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq, claiming the US are: 
 
responsible for all the killings and evictions of the Muslims and the violations of the 
sanctuaries, carried out by your Zionist brothers in Lebanon; you openly supplied them 
with arms and finance. More than 600 000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and 
medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanctions) imposed on Iraq and 
its people…You the USA, together with the Saudi regime, are responsible (Quoted in Al 
Islah, 1996). 
This leads into the actual declaration of jihad against the US and the crusaders: 
 
It is a duty now on every tribe in the Arab Peninsular to fight Jihad in the Cause of Allah 
and to cleanse the land from the occupiers. Allah knows that their blood is permitted (to 
be spilled) and their wealth is a booty…The most Exalted said, in the verse of As-Sayf, 
The Sword: So when the sacred months have passed away, then slay the idolaters 
wherever you find them, and take them captive and besiege them, and lie in wait for them 
in every ambush (Quoted in Al Islah, 1996). 
 
The second element of the fatwa was a critique of the Saudi regime, which held 
three principal criticisms. The first criticism cited the failure to enforce Shariah law 
and the reversion of the regime to man-made civil law. The second criticism was 
focused around the country’s relationship with the US (and allowing them to exploit 
the country) and the final criticism rested on the Kingdom allowing US military assets 
and troops into the country (as the site of Mecca and Medina). 
 
The final element of the Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the 
Land of the Two Holy Places was an attempt to mobilise the Muslim world. Bin 
Laden stated that Muslims should avoid at all costs an internal conflict amongst 
themselves, listing the political and economic consequences: 1) fatalities will be 
among Muslim people, 2) exhaustion of economic and financial resources, 3) 
destruction of infrastructure, 4) dissociation of society, 5) destruction of the oil 
industry, and 6) division of the land of the two Holy Places. The fatwa instructed 
Muslims to boycott American goods, as this money 
 
 will be transformed into bullets used against our brothers in Palestine and tomorrow (in 
the future) against our sons in the land of the two Holy Places. By buying these goods, 
we are strengthening their economy, while out dispossession and poverty increases 
(Quoted in Al Islah, 1996). 
 
This discussion extended to the Saudi purchasing of arms and their economic and 
commercial cooperation with the US, stressing the importance of denying the US 
economic revenue and expressing Muslims’ hate and anger towards the superpower. 
 
This lengthy document represented bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s first comprehensive 
ideological position, citing the three principle ideological foundations for the group; 
war against the US, the overthrowing or altering of the Saudi government, and the 
mobilisation of the Islamic world to facilitate the first two goals. Although the second 
goal of the fatwa was specific to Saudi Arabia and largely concerned Arab nations, it 
addresses the Muslim nation and cites what he calls injustices against Muslims in 
many nations around the world. 
 
World Islamic Front 
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Exactly eighteen months subsequent to the release of the 1996 fatwa, bin Laden, in 
addition to Ayman al-Zawahiri (from the Jihad Group in Egypt), Abu Yasir Rifai 
Ahmad Taha (from the Egyptian Islamic Group), Sheikh Mir Hamzah (from Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-e-Pakistan), and Fazlur Rahman (from the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh), 
released a second fatwa. This collection of Islamic extremist organisations were 
identified as the World Islamic Front, the document entitled The World Islamic Front 
Statement for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. This fatwa had more religious 
authority than bin Laden’s 1996 proclamation due to Sheikh Hamzah’s inclusion. 
 
This much shorter document was more succinct and direct in relation to the 
complaints and directions put forth by the authors. The fatwa first outlined its 
grievances against the US: 1) That the  
 
United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian 
Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorising its 
neighbours, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight 
the neighbouring Muslim peoples (Quoted in Laqueur, 2004: 411); 
 
2) That the US continues sanctions against Iraq despite the resulting death toll 
exceeding one million, despite this, the fatwa claims, the US continues its 
interference in the Middle East, and; 3) Their support for Israel and their weakening 
of Arab and Muslims states to ensure Israel’s prosperity. 
 
These actions, the document claims, are a clear declaration of war on Islam. In 
response the World Islamic Front: 
 
issue this fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians 
and military- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it 
is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] 
from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated 
and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of almighty 
Allah, ‘and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together’, and ‘fight them until 
there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah’ (Quoted 
in Laqueur, 2004: 411-412). 
 
The World Islamic Front statement re-established the principal messages of the 1996 
fatwa, albeit with greater religious authority. This doctrine focused on the jihad 
against the US citing the sanctions in Iraq, troops in Saudi Arabia, and interference in 
the Middle East. The 1998 fatwa did not carry the anti-Saudi rhetoric of the 1996 
document, but was replaced by a greater focus of attention on the state of Israel and 
Jews. The fatwa did not include specific discussion of the mobilisation of Muslims, as 
its lengthier predecessor did, aside from the decree to kill Americans (including 
civilians) and their allies. 
 
Operations 1998-2001 
Six months after the release of this fatwa, on August 7 1998, the US embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were attacked by al-Qaeda suicide 
truck bombs killing 224 people (Bergen, 2001). Following these simultaneous attacks 
(which would become a hallmark of al-Qaeda operations) a group calling itself the 
Islamic Liberation Army of the People of Kenya (a pseudonym) released a statement 
claiming responsibility for the bombings: 
 
The Americans humiliate our people, they occupy the Arabian peninsular, they extract our 
riches, they impose a blockade and, besides, they support the Jews of Israel, our worse 
enemies, who occupy the Al-Aqsa mosque…The attack was justified because the 
government of Kenya recognised that the Americans had used the country’s territory to 
fight against its Moslem neighbours, in particular Somalia. Besides, Kenya cooperated 
with Israel. In this country one finds the most anti-Islamic Jewish centres in all of East 
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Africa. It is from Kenya that the Americans supported the separatist war in Southern 
Sudan, pursued by John Garang’s fighters (Quoted in Haynes, 2005: 187). 
 
This statement makes it clear that the targets and motivations of this attack were 
both American and Jewish, maintaining the rhetoric of the 1998 fatwa. 
 
On October 12 2000, a zodiac,v driven by an al-Qaeda member, filled with over 500 
pounds of explosives rammed the destroyer United States Ship (USS) Cole in the 
port of Aden, in Yemen. The resulting explosion killed 17 US servicemen and injured 
39 (Bergen, 2001). Like the previous attacks al-Qaeda were responsible for or had a 
hand in, bin Laden refused to claim direct responsibility but praised the attacks. Al-
Qaeda’s targeting pattern to this point consisted of US military, government, and 
economic interests in Muslim nations as defined through their doctrine. The 
exception to this assertion is the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre which was 
in the United States.vi 
 
On September 11, 2001, 19 members of al-Qaeda hijacked 4 commercial airliners, 
crashing one each into the North and South towers of the World Trade Centres, the 
Pentagon, and a deserted area of Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to 
retake the aircraft. Each of the hijacked aircraft were carrying approximately 60 000 
pounds of jet fuel, and travelling at around 300 miles per hour. Almost 3 000 people 
died in these attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, 2004).  
 
Bin Laden released several statements following the attacks of September 11. A 
video aired on Al-Jazeera on October 7, 2001, praised Allah and the vanguard 
responsible, making it clear the communiqué was not a claim of responsibility. Bin 
Laden then discussed the justification for such attacks, again citing the deaths of 
innocent children in Iraq as a result of sanctions and the Israeli aggression into 
Palestine. The al-Qaeda leader then stated that the world has now been divided into 
two sides, the believers and the infidels, claiming that “every Muslim has to rush to 
make his religion victorious…neither America nor the people who live in it will dream 
of security before we live it in Palestine, and not before all the infidel armies leave 
the land of Muhammad (2001a)”. This message carried the previously stated political 
motivations with regard to Iraq sanctions, Israeli aggression into Palestine, and US 
troops in Saudi Arabia. The video also conveys a strong message for the 
mobilisation of Islam through the polarisation of Muslims and the West. 
 
Following this statement, on November 3, Al-Jazeera broadcast another video of bin 
Laden which criticised the United Nations and Arab leaders who cooperated with the 
international organisation, claiming that such leaders were infidels (2001b). This was 
followed by similar video, aired on December 27, which termed the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the US and Allies as a crusade against Islam led by America and 
supported by the West in general. Bin Laden claims “our terrorism against America is 
benign. It seeks to make the unjust stop making injustice. It seeks to make America 
stop its support for Israel while killing our people (2001c)”. 
 
From the attacks and statements made by al-Qaeda and bin Laden between 1993 
and 2001, a clear and definitive ideology can be established. This ideology 
specifically draws justification for violence and defensive jihad against the US for its 
military assets in Saudi Arabia, its sanctions on Iraq, and its interference with the 
domestic economic and political affairs of Arab and Muslim nations. Furthermore, 
this jihad extends to Israel and Jews due to their aggression against Arabs and 
                                                 
v A type of small boat. 
vi As well as the failed ‘Bojinka’ plot. 
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Palestine in particular. The next major component of this ideology is a critique of the 
Saudi government, specifically its cooperation with the US and its introduction of civil 
law and diminishing of Islamic law. The final component of the ideology aims at the 
mobilisation of the Islamic world to revolt against secular Muslim regimes and the 
implementation of Shariah law in their stead. 
 
21st Century Islamic Extremist Movement 
 
The September 11 attacks achieved the precise effect that bin Laden and his second 
in command Ayman al-Zawahiri had intended (al-Zawahiri merged his Jihad Group 
with al-Qaeda in 1998 following the 1998 fatwa). The attacks mobilised the Muslim 
world, facilitated further by the invasion of Afghanistan and the common view within 
the Middle East of a crusade into the region.vii During this invasion, al-Zawahiri wrote 
Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, which provided a comprehensive ideological 
insight into the intended development of the group and the directions for al-Qaeda 
and the burgeoning jihadist movement.  
 
Knights under the Prophet’s Banner 
 
While discussing the direction, strategy, and goals of al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri 
discussed the ‘revolutionary fundamentalist movement’, which specifically correlates 
to the best characterisation of the current phase of Islamic extremism, that is, that it 
is now a movement, an ideology, and no longer just a group, as will be demonstrated 
subsequently. 
 
In this doctrine, al-Zawahiri set the goals for the movement which are 1) to organise 
ideological clarity and coherence, 2) resist the current secular regimes within the 
Muslim world, and 3) establish an Islamic state. The resistance suggested by 
Zawahiri was threefold: 1) political activism against secular Muslim states, 2) a 
terrorist campaign within urban areas of these Muslim states, and 3) a terrorist 
campaign against the United States and Israel to increase the jihad’s support within 
the Muslim world (Henzel, 2004). Al-Zawahiri articulated that the priorities of the 
movement should be focused on the Muslim states, while attacks on, and the 
reactions by, Western nations (particularly the US) would further facilitate the 
mobilisation of the Muslim world. “Victory for the Islamic movements…cannot be 
attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab 
region (Quoted in Laqueur, 2004: 426)”. This statement is especially profound when 
we consider the bitter and bloodletting conflict in Iraq (to be discussed further). 
 
According to al-Zawahiri, the current phase of jihad is a revolutionary conflict and the 
“jihad must dedicate one of its revolutionary wings to work with the masses, preach, 
provide services…the people will not love us unless they feel that we love them, care 
about them, and are ready to defend them (Quoted in Henzel, 2004: 17-18)”. This 
strategy is no doubt influenced by the success of HAMAS and Hezbollah’s effective 
use of such programs within Gaza, Palestine and Lebanon. 
 
This addition to al-Qaeda’s doctrine discusses the direction for the group and the 
newly mobilised Islamic population. Unlike the fatwas of 1996 and 1998, al-Zawahiri 
focuses al-Qaeda’s attention on Arab Muslims, unlike previous statements which had 
a global focus. Al-Zawahiri maintains a clear doctrine of revolution within Muslim 
states and to a lesser extent, a continued campaign against the US. This doctrine 
                                                 
vii Assisted by an inappropriate and embarrassing gaffe by US President George W Bush terming the 
US’s response as a crusade. 
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acknowledges that the al-Qaeda leadership meant to establish an Islamic extremist 
movement independent of the al-Qaeda leadership through the mobilisation of Islam. 
 
Operations & Statements 2002-2006 
 
While the 1996 &1998 documents served as ‘declaration of war’, the attacks of 9/11 
conveyed this message far louder than mere words. These attacks, while their 
legitimacy as targets can be argued, saw civilian casualties on a vividly 
unprecedented scale. This marked a shift in target patterns for the 21st Century 
Islamic extremist movement. The increase in security and counter-terrorism 
measures further facilitated this shift through a concentration on ‘soft targets’, 
following the target hardening of critical infrastructure, embassies, and military assets 
and installations. This period has seen scores of Islamic extremist groups, who were 
previously unknown or considered minor groups have risen to join the al-Qaeda led 
campaign against Western nations. In April of 2002, in Tunisia, an al-Qaeda bomber 
detonated a truck carrying natural gas outside a historic Jewish synagogue, which 
killed 21 people. On May 12, 2003, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, four expatriate housing 
complexes were attacked by suicide bombers in explosive filled vehicles. 25 
bystanders were killed in the attacks, later attributed to al-Qaeda (Cooper & Higgins, 
2003). Later that month, twelve al-Qaeda linked suicide bombers attacked Spanish 
and Jewish sites in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 33 people (‘International: After 
Madrid; Morocco and al-Qaeda’, 2004). In November, two Jewish synagogues in 
Istanbul, Turkey were bombed killing 23 people. Just days later, the British 
Consulate, and the British owned HSBC bank were attacked by suicide bombers, 
killing a further 27 people. Joint responsibility was claimed between al-Qaeda and 
the fictional ‘Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front’ (Warning of More Attacks in 
Turkey, 2003). viii  
 
The al-Qaeda financed and backed Indonesian Islamic extremist group Jemaah 
Islamiyah (Islamic community) was responsible for the bombing of night clubs in Bali 
on October 12, 2002, which left over 200 people dead, including 88 Australians. The 
group are also responsible for the Marriott bombing in Jakarta on August 5, 2003, 
which killed 17 and injured 100 (United States Department of State, 2003), and the 
bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, on September 9, 2004, which killed 
ten and injured over a hundred (Soetjipto & Sukarsono, 2004). 
 
The targeting of civilians in the September 11 attacks and the 2002 Bali bombings, 
although previously justified in relation to the killing of American civilians through the 
World Islamic Front statement of 1998, prompted Osama bin Laden to further justify 
such targets in a statement two days after the Bali bombing: 
 
It is a fundamental principle of any democracy that the people choose their leaders, and 
as such, approve the party to the actions of their elected leaders…By electing these 
leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the 
Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the slaughter of the children 
of Iraq. The American people are active members in all these crimes (Al-Qal’ah, 2002). 
 
On March 20, 2003, a coalition led by the US, but consisting of forces from the UK, 
Poland, and Australia invaded Iraq. The invasion was justified through anticipatory 
self-defence in light of the Weapons of Mass Destruction that the coalition claimed 
Iraq possessed (Conte, 2005). A secondary justification for the invasion (which was 
subsequently withdrawn) was based on tentative links between the Saddam Hussein 
                                                 
viii While al-Qaeda was jointly responsible for this operation, it is reported that bin Laden considered it a 
failure as it killed Muslim Turks while its targets were meant to consist of US interests in the nation, 
such as its military bases 
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led Iraqi Government and al-Qaeda. During the ‘major operations’ stage of the 
invasion of Iraq, US warplanes were launched from air force bases in Saudi Arabia, 
further aggrieving bin Laden in his objections.ix On May 1, following a successful 
initial campaign, US President George Bush announced the conclusion of major 
combat operations (Reid, 2003). In the months following this announcement, it 
appeared clear that the insurgency in Iraq led by foreign terrorists threatened to 
plunge the newly liberated Iraq into a guerrilla form of civil war.  
 
The insurgent/terrorist campaign in occupied Iraq directed against US soldiers, 
security forces and civilian contractors, has claimed thousands of lives. On August 
19, 2003, a truck laden with explosives detonated outside the Canal Hotel where the 
UN had based their headquarters in Iraq. 22 people died, including the highest 
ranking UN envoy in the country, Brazilian Vieira de Mello. Over 150 people were 
injured (UN Iraq Security ‘Dysfunctional’, 2003). Similar attacks against institutions 
committed to the post war reconstruction of Iraq, civilians, and US forces within Iraq 
have been claimed by and attributed to groups such as the 1920 Revolution 
Brigades, the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-
Sunna Army, and the Salah al-Din al-Ayubi Brigades (Hafez, 2006). 
 
Due to the Spanish government’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq, on March 11, 
2004, ten explosive devices were detonated on four trains during peak hour in 
Madrid, Spain. The explosions killed 190 people, and injured over 1 400 (Crawford & 
Parker, 2004). An Islamic brigade claiming to be an arm of al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility for the attacks in a video-taped message from al-Qaeda’s military chief 
in Europe, in which he said: “We declare our responsibility for what happened in 
Madrid exactly 2.5 years after the attacks on New York and Washington…More 
blood will flow if the injustices [in Iraq] do not stop (Quoted in Frey, 2004: 1)”. This 
was followed by an audiotape given to the Associated Press in the same month. The 
audiotape was a statement from bin Laden, who called on Muslims of Arab and 
Muslim states to revolt if their governments supported to expressed support for the 
invasion of Iraq (Haynes, 2005). 
 
In mid-April bin Laden (2004) released another audiotape that offered a truce to 
European nations in return for the withdrawal of their armed forces from the Middle 
East. The truce was available for a period of three months and would begin once all 
troops were withdrawn from the Arab world. In the tape, bin Laden promoted their 
action as defensive: Russians were attacked for invading Afghanistan in the 1980s, 
the US were attacked for their ‘invasion’ of the Arabian peninsular and support of 
Israel, and the Europeans were only attacked when they joined the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. This truce was generally rejected outright by European 
nations. 
 
Following the devastating attacks in Madrid and the increase in security levels 
throughout Europe and the West, the movement concentrated its terrorist campaign 
against Saudi Arabia and its American interests. On May 12, 2003, 26 people were 
killed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, when Islamic extremists entered a compound housing 
Western employees of American companies and opened fire with automatic rifles 
before detonating explosives. This attack was followed in November by another 
suicide attack in Riyadh, this time a truck bomb, which killed 18, most of whom were 
Arabs (United States Department of State, 2003). On May 1, 2004, Islamic 
extremists stormed an American owned petrochemical plant in Yanbu’al Bahr, killing 
seven. Later that month extremists attacked an oil installation taking over 50 
                                                 
ix The Saudis allowed these operations as the US promised a withdrawal from Saudi Arabia following 
combat operations in Iraq. While the US largely carried through with this agreement, several hundred 
US troops remain in Iraq. 
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hostages, executing 22 of the hostages. In December of 2004, militants assaulted 
the US consulate in Jeddah, killing four. All the gunmen were killed before they 
entered the consulate building (Boucek, 2006). 
 
Following the attack in Jeddah, bin Laden released another audiotape praising the 
campaign in Saudi Arabia, specifically citing the attack on the US consulate. Bin 
Laden reinforced the central tenets of al-Qaeda’s ideology, criticising the Saudi royal 
family for its lack of commitment to the implementation of Islamic law and its support 
for the US. The al-Qaeda leader appealed to religious scholars, businesses, and 
community leaders to cease their support for the royal family (Blanchard, 2005).  
 
While the Saudi campaign was gathered pace, the insurgency in Iraq continued to 
severely disrupt and devastate the democratisation, security, and stability of Iraq. In 
an al-Qaeda promotional video, al-Zawahiri’s stated: “Here is America among us. So, 
come take revenge on it and extinguish your thirst with its blood” (Quoted in Haynes, 
2005: 178). It is clear that al-Qaeda view Iraq as an opportunity to defeat the US and 
potentially establish an Islamic state. The leader of al-Qaeda Jihad Organisation in 
the Land of the Two Rivers, also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (formerly Jama’at al-
Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War Group)), Abu Masab al-Zarqawi, 
followed al-Zawahiri’s statement with an audiotape in early April, 2004, this 
statement was significant on two levels. The first is the reasons for the US campaign 
in Iraq and the second was the anti-Shiite tirade. Zarqawi lists the reasons for the US 
invasion of Iraq: 1) the resources, 2) to quell the jihadist movement through altering 
the region’s political, economic, and cultural foundations to suit its own interests, 3) 
neo-conservatives employing Talmudic prophecies for “killing Iraqis, raping their 
women, smashing the heads of their children, and pouring death on their heads, as 
they have actually done (2004)”, 4) to ensure the prosperity of Israel, and 5) to 
weaken and dismember the Arab states. Zarqawi introduces the first elements of 
sectarianism by al-Qaeda leadership in a statement: 
 
The Shiites have distorted the Koran, insulted the prophet’s companions, stabbed the 
mothers of the faithful, repudiated the people of Islam and spilled their blood, committed 
great sins and engaged in all kinds of superstitions, falsehood, and myths…They always 
support infidels, including Jews and Christians. They help them in killing Muslims (2004). 
 
It is clear that al-Zarqawi intended to defeat the US through inciting a sectarian, 
facilitated by increasingly brutal attacks against the Shiite population in Iraq. 
 
A fatwa concerning Iraq was released on November 5, 2004 by the Saudi Sheikhs 
Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Awdah, and Ali bin Awad al-Qarni entitled An Open 
Address to the Struggling Iraqi People, declaring jihad in Iraq is the responsibility of 
every able person. This fatwa was followed by another audiotape from bin Laden on 
December 27 that further issued his support for the insurgency in Iraq. In the tape, 
bin Laden officially announces al-Zarqawi as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq and 
encouraged jihadists to fight against the Americans and for Muslims to oppose 
democracy Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to resisting non-Islamic reform within 
Middle Eastern governments. Bin laden again speaks of the unity and mobilisation of 
the Muslim people:  
 
The Iraqi who is waging jihad against the infidel Americans or Allawi’s renegade 
government is our brother and companion, even if he was of Persian, Kurdish, or 
Tukomen origin. The Iraqi who joins this renegade government to fight against the 
Mujahideen…is considered a renegade and one of the infidels, even if he were an Arab 
from the Rabiah or Mudar tribes (Quoted in Blanchard, 2005: 11). 
 
This statement flies in the face of al-Zarqawi’s vilification of Shiites earlier in 2004. 
The clear strategy for al-Qaeda in Iraq is to create as much chaos and instability as 
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possible to ensure the US’s inability to establish a stable and democratic state in 
Iraq. Al-Zarqawi’s attempt to facilitate a civil war between the Sunni and Shiite 
populations of Iraq certainly fulfils this goal. In an October 29, 2004 statement 
claiming responsibility for the September 11 attacks for the first time, bin Laden 
extends his discussion to the situation in Iraq:  
 
And even more dangerous and bitter for America is that the Mujahideen recently forced 
Bush to resort to emergency funds to continue the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is 
evidence of the success of the bleed-until-bankruptcy plan [as, he claims, it worked 
against the Soviet Union] (2004b). 
 
During this period, which appears as a concerted effort by the al-Qaeda leadership to 
divert resources to the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia campaigns, al-Zawahiri 
released another audiotape on January 30, 2005. In this tape, al-Zawahiri introduces 
three tenants of al-Qaeda’s political ideology: 1) the establishment of an Islamic state 
governed through Shariah law, 2) the liberation of the homelands – al-Zawahiri 
maintains that until Muslim lands are liberated and free from aggression, reform and 
free elections cannot take place, 3) the liberation of the human being, a social 
contract that would “specify the power of the Shariah-based judiciary, and insure that 
no one can dispose of people’s rights, except in accordance with this judiciary 
(Quoted in Blanchard, 2005: 7)”.  
 
This statement by al-Zawahiri is profoundly significant in that it acknowledges and 
gives credence to a Shariah-based democratic system as well as reforms of 
traditional Islamic states. Arguably, the introduction of these concepts directly 
contradict statements made previously by bin Laden in relation to Saudi Arabia. This 
possibly represents an attempt to appeal to the more secular Muslims that support 
representative government but nonetheless represents a dramatic shift in ideology 
and political philosophy. 
 
Islamic extremists carried through with al-Qaeda’s threats of further action if their 
truce was rejected in Europe on July 7, 2005 when suicide bombers detonated 
explosive devices carried in backpacks on three London Underground trains within 
50 seconds of each other at 8.50AM and one on a double-decker bus at 9.47AM. 
The bombings killed 56 people and injured over 700. Within hours a statement was 
released by The Secret Organisation Group of al-Qaeda in Europe. This statement 
stated: 
 
Nations of Islam and Arab nations: Rejoice, for it is time to take revenge against the 
British Zionist crusader government in retaliation for the massacres Britain is committing 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The heroic Mujahideen [holy warriors] have carried out a blessed 
raid [ghazwx] in London. Britain is now burning with fear, terror and panic in its northern, 
southern, eastern, and western quarters.  
 
We have repeatedly warned the British government and people. We have fulfilled our 
promise and carried out our blessed military raid in Britain after our Mujahideen exerted 
strenuous efforts over a long period of time to ensure the success of the raid.  
 
We continue to warn the governments of Denmark and Italy and all the crusader 
governments that they will be punished in the same way if they do not withdraw their 
troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. He who warns is excused (Nur al-Iman, 2004).  
 
The last sentence is a rebuttal to Muslims who condemn Islamic terrorism, indicating 
that through the Koran, if a warning is given, the resulting violence is excused. 
 
On September 1, 2005, al-Jazeera aired an al-Qaeda video featuring al-Zawahiri and 
one of the London bombers, Muhammad Sadiq Khan. This tape again attempts to 
                                                 
x An attack for the purposes of conquest. 
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justify the targeting of civilians when Khan states “Your democratically elected 
governments continue to perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the 
world…Your support for them makes you directly responsible”. Al-Zawahiri expands 
on this statement by promising further attacks in Europe following the rejection of bin 
Laden’s truce. 
 
Following the attacks in London, there have been several disrupted and successful 
attacks by Islamic extremists, the most significant of the successful operations were 
the October 2005 Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah (United States Department of 
State, 2006), which killed 23 people, and the July 2006 Mumbai train bombings by 
the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous) which killed 207 
people. In a statement by bin Laden released on an internet site on June 30, the al-
Qaeda amir responded to the death of al-Zarqawi in Iraq by US forces, warning that 
“the banner [of al-Qaeda in Iraq] hasn’t dropped but has passed from one lion of 
Islam to another” and that “we will continue, God willing, to fight you and your allies 
everywhere…in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Somalia and Sudan until we waste all 
your money and kill your men (2006)”. 
 
Findings 
 
The review of al-Qaeda and the 21st Century Islamic extremist movement’s activities 
and statements identifies an ideology and strategy that while maintaining a 
consistent foundation, has changed dramatically, particularly following the 
September 11 attacks. Since 2001, al-Qaeda has generally claimed responsibility for 
its attacks and usually offers justification for the action on both political and religious 
grounds. This has become far more commonplace since al-Qaeda’s shift to attacking 
soft targets and aiming for mass civilian casualties. As has been demonstrated, al-
Qaeda has gone to great lengths to justify these targets. Additionally, the focus of al-
Qaeda shifted dramatically to the Arab world as oppose to the entire Muslim nation 
of the earlier fatwas of 1996 and 1998, demonstrating a strategic shift following the 
mobilisation of the revolutionary fundamentalist movement. 
 
Al-Qaeda’s efforts to mobilise the Islamic world has been a successful endeavour. 
The 21st Century Islamic extremist movement is an ideological concept that appeals 
to its constituency through the participation of others, similar to the propaganda of 
the deed doctrine of anarchist terrorism during the late 18th to early 20th Centuries. 
Within the propaganda of the deed doctrine, Individual actions and the response they 
garner increases the participation and mobilisation of the movement. Despite this 
seemingly decentralised leviathan-esque movement, it appears that the al-Qaeda 
leadership largely remains in charge (at least within the ideological scope examined 
within this article). The priorities, targets, and justification are all directed through 
statements made by bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and formerly to a lesser extend the now 
deceased al-Zarqawi. 
 
The current strategy of al-Qaeda appears to entail the support and deepening of 
conflicts in the Middle East such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent Saudi 
Arabia and Palestine, while attempting attacks in Europe to discourage support for 
the US and the conflicts in the Middle East. This is particularly relevant to the 
insurgency in Iraq, which the group sees as a direct opportunity for the movement to 
establish an Islamic state under Shariah law. 
 
While the foundation of al-Qaeda’s doctrine remains consistent in its grievances 
against the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, its mobilisation of the Islamic world, and the 
establishment of Islamic law within Muslim nations, its ideological consistency has 
suffered through the development of the movement. The first major inconsistency is 
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the targeting of Shi’a Muslims by al-Qaeda in Iraq. In bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa, he 
specifically discourages a war within Islam, furthermore, al-Qaeda assisted in the 
1996 Khobar Towers operation with Hezbollah, a Shi’a Islamic group. Despite these 
examples, in addition to bin Laden’s general message of Islamic unity in the 
liberation of Iraq, and general Salafist theology, al-Zarqawi specifically targeted 
Shiite Muslims and symbols. While these tactics may facilitate a civil war within Iraq 
and ensure a failed state and US withdrawal, it represents a major inconsistency 
within al-Qaeda ideology and doctrine. 
 
The second major inconsistency within the doctrine was al-Zawahiri’s statement on 
Islamic reform and democracy, directly contradicting bin Laden. This represents an 
enormous shift in ideology and also directly contradicts with al-Zarqawi’s criticism of 
the Iraqi election: “we shall not accept the rule of anyone but that of God and his 
Prophet (Quoted in Blanchard, 2005: 7)”.  
 
The importance al-Zawahiri places on ideological consistency is not unfounded, as 
such inconsistencies within the political/theological doctrine of al-Qaeda and its 
various factions and arms, have the potential to facilitate factional splits between 
different sections of the organisation, imitating the splintering phenomenon that was 
witnessed through many organisations throughout the period of international 
terrorism. These factions may take the form of more violent organisations, such as 
al-Qaeda in Iraq, or potentially pure political wings pursuing or assisting identical 
goals through a political process. In addition, this may also result in sectarian or 
factional violence between sections of the Salafist movement for resources or 
dominance. 
 
In Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner al-Zawahiri specified the first goal of the 
revolutionary fundamentalist movement was ideological clarity and coherence. It is 
clear that this goal has not yet been fulfilled as there are elements of the movement’s 
ideology that are incoherent and inconsistent. It is unclear whether these 
inconsistencies simply represent differences between al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, or are more endemic within the movement’s 
ideology. Regardless, such statements have ensured that al-Zawahiri’s first and most 
important goal for the revolutionary fundamentalist movement remains unfulfilled, 
indicating (through al-Zawahiri’s logic) that the resistance against secular regimes 
and the establishment of an Islamic state are currently unfeasible. Additionally, it is 
clear that such inconsistencies represent junctures for potential instability for al-
Qaeda and the global Salafist movement. The continued study of the development, 
inconsistency, and understanding of al-Qaeda doctrine is a necessary element of 
terrorism studies, as are the potential implications of such research for both terrorism 
studies researchers and counter-terrorism practitioners.  
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